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ABSTRACT 
 
Zimbabwe’s public policy trajectory has courted global attention specifically through 
its redistributive policies that include the land reform programme – which was 
implemented in the first decade of independence; and the black economic 
empowerment programme, which was implemented in the 1990s through affirmative 
action initiatives until the enactment of the comprehensive Indigenisation and 
Economic Empowerment Act in 2007. Notably, indigenisation has been the rallying 
ideology undergirding the state’s redistribution agenda since the 1980s. Over time, 
the understanding and application of the concept have raised serious questions on 
aspects of autochthony, nativity, belonging, and citizenship. Evidence on the ground 
suggests that the concept has been deliberately twisted, highly politicised, and 
manipulated as an instrument of exclusionary politics played at racial, political, class, 
and nationality levels, with the effect of calculatively side-lining potential beneficiaries, 
as well as facilitating the expropriation and dispossession of critical resources and 
assets from perceived “foreigners” in the country. Politicisation of indigenisation, 
economic empowerment, and autochthony has thrust clientelism, cronyism, loyalty, 
and political correctness as major criteria for accessing benefits of ownership and 
control of key strategic resources such as land and minerals, as well as shareholding 
in economic empowerment deals. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Redistribution of wealth and resources has always been a top agenda item for most 
postcolonial societies that are still grappling with legacies of colonialism and 
imperatives of state making and nation building (Mukwedeya 2016:8). The backdrop 
of foreign economic dominance in the postcolonial state has provided justification for 
the introduction of indigenisation policies as a way of rectifying historical wrongs that 
bred inequality and unbalanced access to resources and racially determined economic 
ownership patterns. This paper seeks to delve into some of the issues arising from 
Zimbabwe’s trajectory of redistribution of wealth and resources. It particularly 
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attempts to expose how indigenisation has been perverted by extreme politicisation 
of processes, racist retaliatory overtones, exclusionary politics, as well as overt and 
covert manifestations of violence that have accompanied the redistribution process. 
The whole experience thrusts the autochthony question to the fore in the wake of the 
violent expropriation of land from white landowners without compensation that 
characterised the land reform programmes in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2002 
(Chilunjika & Uwizeyimana 2015:131). The entry point to the discussion is the 
definition and understanding of the concept of “indigenisation” and its various forms 
observable in practice. The paper proceeds to discuss the highly debatable aspect of 
“indigeneity” as applied in the context of Zimbabwe. The discussion further focuses 
on analysing the deliberately created but loosely declared multiple bifurcations on 
indigenisation that have solely served the segregationist, selfish interests of the 
political class and their followers. The focus is mainly on highlighting the multiple, 
thinly disguised demarcations that have been used in the play of politics of exclusion 
to effectively sideline many potential beneficiaries on the basis of race, political 
affiliation, nationality, and class. The paper concludes by discussing the autochthony 
question, with emphasis on the clash of territorial rights of the “sons of the soil” and 
the property rights of the “foreigners”. 
 
INDIGENISATION: MEANING AND FORMS 
 
Among the numerous definitions of “indigenisation” there is no dispute regarding its 
meaning despite its practical application in diverse contexts that range from Latin 
America, Africa, through to Asian countries. The emphasis across most scholarly views 
lies on the transfer of wealth mostly from “foreigners” to “natives” through widened 
participation of the latter in national economies. In their rather limited definition, 
Bucheli and Decker (2002:1) view indigenisation as “the transfer of wealth out of the 
hands of foreigners (often small or medium sized businesses) to local citizens”. In 
another definition, Adedeji and Ake (1981:31) define indigenisation as “the process 
by which a government limits participation in a particular industry entirely or in part 
to citizens of the country, thus forcing alien owners either to sell to indigenous 
entrepreneurs or to withdraw from participation in certain economic activities”. The 
perspectives above neither make explicit reference to how indigenisation is 
implemented nor give any justification for carrying out the process. Zimbabwe’s 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (IEE) Act of 2007 (Chapter 14:33) 
expresses indigenisation “as a deliberate involvement of indigenous Zimbabweans in 
the economic activities of the country, to which hitherto they had no access, so as to 
ensure the equitable ownership of the nation’s resources”. Emerging elements that 
previous definitions did not capture include issues of racial marginalisation and 
equality, which seem to carry both the justification why indigenisation must be carried 
out, and the goals that such an indigenisation effort seeks to achieve.  
 
Adedeji and Ake (1981:31) highlight the four common forms that indigenisation has 
taken in Africa since the early years of independence. These are: (a) indigenisation of 
ownership, which seeks to give economic ownership to nationals either at individual 
or group level; (b) indigenisation of control, which seeks to give indigenous citizens 
control over policies of enterprises by pushing them into positions of boards of 
directors; (c) indigenisation of manpower, which is also known as Africanisation of 
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personnel. This form of indigenisation, which is the earliest in Africa, sought to push 
indigenes up the occupational ladder and cause them to replace expatriate personnel, 
especially in the civil service; and (d) indigenisation of technology, which involves 
acquisition of foreign advanced technology and subsequently adapting it to suit African 
conditions. Acquiring technology from industrialised countries has been criticised for 
perpetuating dependency of developing countries on the industrialised countries of 
the global North (Adedeji and Ake 1981:31).  
 
To this list of forms of indigenisation, Hanafi (1981:55) adds indigenisation of cultural 
and educational systems and official languages. Owusu-Ansah (1981:133) has also 
suggested that apart from the four common forms of indigenisation given by Adedeji, 
governments can also establish state economic organisations that complement, 
compete, or push out foreign-owned enterprises. Indigenisation as a policy, especially 
in developing countries, has been adopted for several reasons, which include reducing 
levels of ownership of the means of production by foreigners; breaking foreign 
monopolies, especially on strategic resources; pushing economic decolonisation and 
reducing economic dependence on industrialised countries and external players; and 
fostering self-sustainability and sufficient control of national economies by the 
indigenes (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA] 1978:1; Owusu-
Ansah 1981:133; Adedeji and Ake 1981:32). Indigenisation is often confused with, 
and/or used interchangeably with – albeit incorrectly – nationalisation. The latter 
involves a process whereby the government requires foreign private enterprises to sell 
or transfer all or part of their equity to government (Wilson 1990:402). Under 
indigenisation, foreign companies sell their equity to local citizens. In Zimbabwe, three 
forms of indigenisation are notable: firstly, indigenisation of the civil service, which is 
better known as “Africanisation of the bureaucracy”, which started in May 1980; 
secondly, indigenisation of land, which was basically executed across decades since 
1980 through the land redistribution programme; and thirdly, indigenisation of the 
economy, that is currently implemented through the Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Act of 2007. This law seeks to give “indigenous Zimbabweans” a 
majority shareholding of 51% in all foreign-owned businesses with a net asset value 
of US$500 000 and more. 
 
Generally, it is noted that experiences of indigenisation programmes in Africa are 
inspired by a background of economic dependence inherited from the colonial era and 
reinforced in the postcolonial period. Other scenarios in Africa reveal patterns of 
economic inequity and disequilibrium along racial lines, favouring mostly Europeans 
and Asians and relegating Africans to the lowest levels of the economic hierarchy (Gazi 
2016:1). These situations have provided the motivation for the pursuit of 
indigenisation policies in different African countries (Mukwedeya 2016:8). Such 
policies have generally come in three phases: firstly, Africanisation of the public 
bureaucracy, which Adedeji and Ake (1981:30) characterise as “the battle-cry of the 
1960s”; secondly, indigenisation of strategic sectors of the economy; and thirdly, 
nationalisation of key industries, especially in the extractive sector. Indigenisation in 
Africa has evolved over time and in different stages, scales, conceptual designs, and 
practical applications across individual countries (Adedeji 1981:45). The raison d’être 
of indigenisation in Africa, whether in Ghana during the Kwame Nkrumah presidency 
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(1 July 1960 – 24 February 1966), in Tanzania under Nyerere’s Ujamaa’s1 programme 
(1967 – 5 November 1985), or Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso (1983 – 1987), has 
generally, if not exclusively been to achieve economic independence in the context of 
foreign dominance in national economies. However, this does not seem to have been 
the case in Zimbabwe. In addition to poor policy articulation, politicisation, and 
nepotism, the approach to indigenisation in Zimbabwe has been “ad hoc, piecemeal 
and lacking in internal consistency” (Adedeji 1981:45).  
 
DEBATING INDIGENEITY IN ZIMBABWE  
 
The definitional issues surrounding the concept of indigeneity, which draws under its 
ambit “notions about race and nativism, nationhood and citizenship, rights and 
entitlements” (Muzondidya 2007:325, 333), still maintain a strong currency in both 
the media and scholarly community. Discussions and debates about the issue have 
received significant coverage from scholars such as Freeman (2014:349-366), Dunn 
(2009:113-127), Andreasson (2010:134-138), Fisher (2010:140-153), Matyszak 
(2014:1-11; 2011:1-6), and Muzondidya (2007:325-341). The development and 
application of the concept of indigeneity can be traced back to the Rhodesian era 
proceeding into the post-independence period. The Rhodesian Constitution of 1961 
and 1969 divided colonial society into two main races – Europeans and Africans, a 
dualisation which was replicated in local government structures, in access to social 
services and educational opportunities, infrastructural development, and land 
apportionment, among many other aspects. The colonial constitution of 1961, 
however, was silent on the issue of indigeneity per se, as it did not explicitly recognise 
any of the two main races as the original inhabitants or descendants of such 
inhabitants (Fisher 2010:132). The position of the original natives of the land is given, 
instead, to the San (the “Bushmen”) who were “hunter-gathering Stone Age peoples 
who lived on and around Zimbabwe’s Central Plateau from about 3 000 BC and who 
had now all but disappeared” (Fisher 2010:32). This argument does not only disqualify 
claims of nativity by either of the two main races, but simultaneously qualifies them 
as immigrants and settlers – in one way or the other – who came to settle on the land 
after the original inhabitants and their descendants had vacated the territory (Beach 
1980:4). The question then is no longer about ownership of territory but rather about 
which race or tribe settled first after the original inhabitants had disappeared (Beach 
1980:4). Indeed, of the two main races – Europeans and Africans (Shona and Ndebele) 
– the periods of arrival are different, with the Shona arriving first in three waves during 
the first millennium AD, later the Ndebele during the mid-1800s, and lastly the 
Europeans later in that century (Fisher 2010:132; Beach 1980:6-9). As argued by 
Whaley (1973:31), “Rhodesia is the permanent and rightful home of people of 
different origins and backgrounds and does not belong to one race alone”. In an open 
letter to President Mugabe in 2005, Ben Freeth (2011:249) revisited the problematic 
Zimbabwean autochthony narratives arguing that “the history of colonialism is not 
quite the simple history that it is often made out to be”.  
 
                                                            
1 The Swahili word ujamaa means “extended family”, “brotherhood”, or “socialism”; as a political concept it 
asserts that a person becomes a person through the people or community. 
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Freeth justifies this claim by retracing the various tribal and racial movements and 
conquests among them, which altogether comes down to an “interaction of migrants”: 
 
“You will know though that the history of colonialism in Zimbabwe started more 
than a thousand years ago – first with the Bantu tribes, of which you are a part, 
moving from the north forcing the San people out; then with Shaka Zulu forcing 
Mzilikazi out to the west of the Drakensberg mountains; then with the British 
(who had come, like your people, from the north) forcing the Boers out of the 
Cape; then with the Ndebele destroying Boer trek parties coming from the 
south; then with the Boers retaliating and the Ndebele being forced out of the 
Transvaal to the north; then with the Ndebele forcing the Shonas to the north; 
then with the Rudd and Lippert concessions and the various other agreements 
with the Shona chiefs where written legal history was made for the first time” 
(Freeth 2011:248-9). 
 
In the post-independence period (1980 onwards), debates on indigeneity did not die 
despite official pronouncements of racial harmony reflected in the reconciliation policy 
formulated soon after independence. This reconciliation discourse provided a veneer 
that lay atop an unsettled interior where an undercurrent born of colonial race 
relations was always active and silently seeking a conduit for open manifestation. The 
official state policy characterised Zimbabwe as a non-racial society, but a shadow of 
deep contradictions always loomed large in the face of unsettled colonial inequalities 
that demanded redress – a process in which there was no way of avoiding serious 
racial disturbances. In the early years of independence, interests were mobilised 
around the black advancement agenda, and several pressure groups arose and 
actively campaigned and lobbied the government on the matter. The government, for 
its own part, had already set the ball rolling on the black empowerment agenda 
through the Presidential Directive for Africanisation of the Public Service, which 
accelerated the entry and promotion of black indigenous Africans in the bureaucracy. 
The targeting of affirmative action initiatives on black indigenous Africans continued 
the indigeneity discourse through the revival of racial exclusion under the new black 
majority government. In this case, it is not only the roots of indigeneity that are thrown 
into question, but also the elements which made up the bracket described as “black 
indigenous Africans”.  
 
Following its ascension to power in 1980, the ruling ZANU-PF party assumed the 
position of the latter-day author of national(ist) and/or patriotic history (Magure 
2014:42-43; Phimister 2008:28; Tendi 2010:4, 2008:379; Ranger 2004:219-227), in 
whose narrative the right to territory was accorded to the blacks, and at the same 
time systematically portraying whites as “colonists, immigrants and settlers” (Fisher 
2010:137). The discourse of patriotic history has been monopolised, manipulated, 
selectively applied, and, to an extent, abused by ZANU-PF as the foremost claimant of 
the liberator accolade. The kind of patriotic history narrated from the ZANU-PF 
perspective has been disapproved and discredited as a “repackaged narrative [that] 
proclaims ZANU-PF as the alpha and omega of Zimbabwe’s past, present and future” 
(Tendi 2008:379). The narrow conception of “indigenous Zimbabweans” indicative of 
exclusive nationalism has created problems of situating Zimbabwean minorities in the 
discourse. As the political fortunes of the state were hitting hard times with the rise 
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of opposition politics in the post-independence period, some of its survival strategies 
forced some back peddling on its formerly embraced conciliatory approach that saw 
the accommodation of all races in the country soon after independence. Exclusive 
nationalist discourse was introduced instead, and found major expression in the 
redistribution of critical resources such as land.  
 
The narrow conceptions of indigeneity peddled in the post-independence period have 
been argued to produce exclusivist and racist politics, especially in resource ownership 
(Andreasson 2010:135; Dunn 2009:114; Muzondidya 2007:333). As argued by 
Muzondidya (2007:333), the government “abandoned both its political conciliatory 
approach and the inclusive nationalism of the early period and instead adopted a 
radical, exclusive nationalist stance”. Read from the government’s perspective, the 
understanding of “native indigenous Africans” is exclusionary and rigid, covering only 
“vana vevhu/abantwana bomuhlabati (sons of the soil) […] who have pre-eminent 
rights to the country’s land and other resources” (Muzondidya 2007:325; Mudzengi 
2008:383; Andreasson 2010:136). This claim is further echoed in the words of former 
vice president, Joice Mujuru: “They [white farmers] call themselves Zimbabweans. 
They are not. I am a Zimbabwean. When will you learn? Africa is for black Africans” 
(quoted in Freeth 2011). These automatically became the sole beneficiaries of the 
government’s black empowerment programmes and affirmative action arrangements.   
  
The post-independence notion of indigeneity, which has been exclusively crafted 
around the race of black “indigenous Zimbabweans”, has resulted in “black racism” 
(Raftopoulos and Moyo 1994:2), “exclusionary autochthony” (Dunn 2009:114), 
“reverse discrimination” (Murombo 2010:587), and/or “otherization of Zimbabwe’s 
minorities” (Fisher 2010:143), which, in other words, effectively resulted in 
“perpetuation of marginalization of minorities” (Andreasson 2010:135). And as if to 
continue the colonial racial distinction along “racial binaries: black and white binaries, 
without any middle ground” (Muzondidya 2007:333-334), the ZANU-PF government 
used the same racial categorisation which had obvious problems of positioning 
“invisible subject minorities” (Muzondidya 2007:325) such as Asians, coloureds, and 
other “non-indigenous” Africans (mostly migrant labour). Asians and coloureds have 
unfortunately been viewed as both instruments and “beneficiaries of colonialism” 
(Fisher 2010:137). An example of disapproval of minorities is given by Ushewokunze 
(1984:15), who argues that in the colonial economy, Asians and coloureds enjoyed 
some privileges that natives did not have, and also benefited in various other ways 
from the discriminatory racial relations of the time. This perspective, which 
significantly reflects a wholesale condemnation of minorities, ignores the fact that the 
Asian and coloured communities were never uniform in terms of political opinion or 
support for the colonial system, and therefore, some were in support of it while others 
were against it (Stigger 1970:6 quoted in Fisher 2010:138).  
 
In recent years, coloureds have – through their representatives – broken the silence 
on the ongoing “discrimination” by not only objecting to the crude racial exclusion in 
the national discourse, but also through asserting their position on the question of 
belonging, and identifying themselves as part of the “indigenous Zimbabweans” too.  
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In a speech to the coloured community in Bulawayo in 2013, Senator Aguy C. Georgias 
opined: 
 
“We are Zimbabweans, first and foremost. This is where we belong. We are 
therefore equal to all fellow Zimbabweans. We have no reason to feel different, 
nor for that matter to want to be treated differently. It is, however, from our 
full integration with the rest of the Zimbabwean nation that we derive our 
national identity [....] We now have a new constitution in place, which among 
other things says no longer must we suffer discrimination, to be called ‘aliens’ 
in our own country of birth and to be denied access to bank loans to start-up 
businesses” (Georgias cited in The Herald 04/06/2013). 
   
One view has been that there are blood ties between coloureds and the African 
community, and yet another suggests that coloureds, in some cases, have suffered 
even more oppression than black Africans (Fisher 2010:138). For example, while 
pieces of legislation such as the Land Act effectively confined the coloured community 
in Salisbury to suburbs such as Arcadia and areas around Kopje, there were wealthy 
black professionals and businessmen who lived in elite suburbs very much like whites 
(Fisher 2010:138). 
 
INDIGENISATION’S MULTIPLE BIFURCATIONS AS LAYERS OF EXCLUSION 
 
The concept of indigenisation in Zimbabwe is basically applied at multiple levels: racial, 
class, party, and nationality levels. Each of these levels has its own bifurcation that 
can be given as black/white; elites/non-elites; party loyalists/non-loyalists; and 
Zimbabweans/non-Zimbabweans respectively. In practice, this classification, which 
lies at the heart of the politics of belonging, serves to facilitate the play of exclusivist 
politics that always rewards some and deprives others on the basis of pre-formed 
subjective, exclusionary demarcations. Politics of belonging, which have come with 
significant bearing on accessing benefits of indigenisation processes, have benefited 
from the vague, ambiguous definition of what the indigenisation law terms “indigenous 
Zimbabweans”. Section 2(1) of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act of 
2007 defines an “indigenous Zimbabwean” as 
  
“any person who, before the 18th of April, 1980, was disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of his or her race, and any descendant of such 
person, and includes any company, association, syndicate or partnership of 
which indigenous Zimbabweans form the majority of the members or hold the 
controlling interest” (IEE Act, No. 14 of 2007: Section 2(1)). 
 
The definition above pre-sets the stage for the play of exclusionary bifurcations. Layer 
upon layer, potential beneficiaries are peeled off and shut out of the universe of 
indigenisation benefits. 
 
Racial level: ‘black as indigene’ 
 
The definition of “indigenous Zimbabweans” seems to exclude all whites in Zimbabwe 
and is accommodative of non-white Zimbabweans. This way it carries a punitive flair 
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tantamount to reverse racism where the unsaid but loud “now-it’s-our-turn” verdict is 
unobtrusively passed on all whites in the country. In some instances, these claims 
have been expressly confirmed by politicians; for example, the Minister of 
Indigenisation, Patrick Zhuwao’s perspective on indigenisation and economic 
empowerment has always viewed whites as previously “over-advantaged” (Nehanda 
Radio 12/11/2015) at the expense of blacks, which then gives occasion for a race-
based advancement of blacks in the post-independence era in the country: 
 
“Indigenisation is a policy based on race; that is a fact. It is a policy that 
specifically seeks to give black people an advantage over white people and the 
justification is that white people have previously been over-advantaged and we 
need to be clear on that [....] I can put it in nice ways [...] equitable access and 
so on, but ndezvevanhu vatema, ndizvozvo (it’s for black people and that is 
that!) and that is the bottom line” (Zhuwao cited in Nehanda Radio 
12/11/2015).  
 
These sentiments by Zhuwao are, however, not isolated. In the same context of 
indigenisation, Philip Chiyangwa once referred to the “use of race-based measures to 
ameliorate the effects of past discrimination on the opportunities enjoyed by blacks” 
(The Hansard 2000). Given the colonial history of racially loud laws and policies, the 
indigenisation law can effortlessly pass for a race-based retaliation legislation, which, 
in effect, contaminates the term “indigenous Zimbabwean”, decidedly recasting it to 
“indigenous black Zimbabwean”. Racist connotations of the law have opened 
significant grounds for criticism based on the constitutional right of freedom from 
discrimination on the grounds of race or national origin, as well as the right to equal 
protection of the law (Gwisai 2011:25). 
 
Matyszak (2011:3) raises a query on semantics surrounding the use of the term 
“indigenous” of which he argues that in the context of the indigenisation law, it is 
“incorrect and euphemistic”. The dictionary meaning of the term and the meaning in 
the regulations are very different; suggesting that it has been deliberately chosen “to 
exploit insidious political and racial considerations” (Matyszak 2011:3). Otherwise, 
considering the intended effect or meaning in the context of indigenisation, the correct 
term is “autochthonous”, which describes the original inhabitants of a geographical 
area (Carleton 2014:66; Matyszak 2011:3; Dunn 2009:113). The hidden political, 
racial, and exclusivist agenda would not be realised if the correct term were to be 
used because “the term autochthone is more inclusive of multiple groups of people 
who live upon the land and may have a claim to being there” (Carleton 2014:66). Poor 
wording is also noted in the use of “any person” instead of “any Zimbabwean”, the 
effect of which qualifies many non-Zimbabweans as beneficiaries of the indigenisation 
programme, for example, a South African who suffered discrimination under the 
apartheid system before 18 April 1980 fits well into the bracket (Matyszak 2011:3). 
 
Renowned Zimbabwean businessman, Mutumwa Mawere (2007:1), posed a very 
pertinent question in one of his online commentaries on national policy issues when 
he asked: “Does indigenisation threaten law of succession?” The question obviously 
attempts to draw attention to the implications of the indigenisation programme on the 
law of succession. Beginning at the turn of the millennium, race issues have been 
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thrust to the heart of the national question, especially as such issues relate to the 
redistribution discourse in the post-independence period. In the context of the loud 
racial connotations in the national indigenisation drive, Mawere (2007:1) bares some 
of the pockets of fear, asking: 
 
“What will happen to black Zimbabweans married to whites who may qualify as 
beneficiaries of indigenisation? Would their successors who may well be white 
be eligible to keep the rights and transfer them in line with succession laws 
with no risk of the state seeking to negotiate such rights on account of race?” 
 
The fears reflected in the questions above seem to highlight a possibility of racial 
expropriation of resources from a posterity of mixed blood on the basis of vague and 
narrow definitions of indigenous Zimbabweans. Comparatively, in the South African 
Broad-Based Economic Empowerment law, the definition of “black people” is broader, 
taking in black Africans, Indians, coloureds, and even the Chinese.  
 
Nationality level: “Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans” 
 
The redistribution agenda in Zimbabwe has been guided in such a manner as to 
systematically exclude descendants of what Muzondidya (2007:325; 2004:213) calls 
“invisible subject minorities” or “alien natives” who constitute at least two million 
immigrants from other surrounding African countries such as Malawi, Mozambique, 
and Zambia. Others are of Indian and Malaysian origin, who originally came to 
Southern Rhodesia in search of economic opportunities. Lately, there has been a 
steady increase of the Chinese population, mostly in cities, towns, and mining areas. 
Historically, labour shortages on commercial farms meant that white farmers had to 
rely on foreign African labour to fill the gaps. Foreign labour also took up jobs in the 
mining industry and menial jobs in the cities and towns of the country. Unfortunately, 
in the present times the descendants of these diverse groups find themselves trapped 
in an uncomfortable dilemma of bearing the “foreigner” tag in the country of their 
birth, Zimbabwe, and at the same time they cannot lay claims of citizenship in their 
countries of descent. The nationality question has been revived in the country’s 
indigenisation law following intense lobbying from the vocal indigenous lobby group 
Affirmative Action Group (AAG), which bemoaned the ever-increasing presence of 
Nigerians, Chinese, and Indians in retail and wholesale trade – lines of which they feel 
should be left to indigenous Zimbabweans operating small and medium enterprises. 
It is argued that opening doors for foreigners to operate such businesses defeats the 
whole purpose and essence of “broad-based” empowerment of indigenous 
Zimbabweans. In response to the “threat” of an increasing foreign business presence 
in small retail and wholesale businesses, the government made provisions in Statutory 
Instrument 21 of 2010 with the effect of forbidding investment by foreign investors in 
sectors classified as “reserved sectors”, 14 in total, including agriculture, 
transportation, retail and wholesale trade, barber shops, salons, grain milling, and 
bakeries, among others. David Chapfika, the National Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Board (NIEEB) chairman, explained categorically that the “reserved 
sectors” should only be operated by “locals” because the indigenisation law “refers to 
indigenous Zimbabweans, not blacks all over Africa” (Shout Africa 09/09/2010).    
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Political level: “opposition as sell-outs, villains, and enemies of the 
revolution” 
 
A review of literature shows that political leadership can pursue wilful exclusion of 
political rivals, especially in the distribution of state benefits (Uwizeyimana 2017:n.p.). 
Redistributive policies in Zimbabwe have not escaped this tainting touch of divisive 
identity politics. As argued by Magure (2014:22), the ZANU-PF party “generally favours 
its supporters with respect to state-led empowerment schemes in return for votes and 
financial kickbacks. Thus, redistributive policies become a new election-winning 
formula for the party, among other unorthodox strategies such as intimidation and 
violence”. Exclusionary politics have not only been applied in the racial sidelining of 
white Zimbabweans and coloureds in accessing economic empowerment benefits, but 
it has also found its way in further creating divisions along party lines among the so-
called “indigenous Zimbabweans” themselves. It is instructive to note that 
exclusionary politics have been championed by the ZANU-PF party leadership; for 
example, Mugabe once said: “Let MDC supporters get allocated land in Britain where 
they have been getting pounds and politics. They cannot benefit from policies they 
have rejected and even opposed” (Mugabe quoted in Magure 2014:22). Empirical 
observations made by Matondi (2012:91) seem to validate Mugabe’s statement, by 
highlighting that benefits of land were not an open-for-all affair, but rather were 
guided by identity politics that sought the sidelining of opposition followers and non-
supporters of the revolutionary ZANU-PF party: “Although ZANU-PF had the largest 
say in the land allocation process, some opposition members smuggled themselves on 
to the beneficiary lists and duly benefited.” Those from what ZANU-PF deems “wrong 
camps” could only benefit through other (rather unorthodox) channels not necessarily 
designated by the party. Exclusionary politics have basically been anchored on the 
“patriots and sell-outs/heroes and villains distinction” (Magure 2014:22) that glorifies 
some while simultaneously condemning others.  
 
In Mugabe’s, and by extension the ZANU-PF’s, narrative, the opposition represents 
everything Western – specifically British and American, therefore a new face of 
yesteryear colonisers seeking to re-establish their foothold in the country. Mugabe 
once argued thus: “The MDC should never be judged or characterised by its black 
trade union face [....] [I]t is immovably and implacably moored in the colonial 
yesteryear and embraces wittingly or unwittingly the repulsive ideology of return to 
white settler rule [....] It is a counter-revolutionary Trojan horse contrived and 
nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslaved and oppressed our people 
yesterday” (Mugabe 2001:88). Demonisation of the opposition has been deployed as 
part of a propagandist smear campaign (Uwizeyimana 2016:38), that has always come 
juxtaposed with glowing heroic ZANU-PF nationalist liberation narratives, with the net 
effect of inflating the credit of the liberators and “guardians of the nation” on the one 
hand, and inflating the “sins” of the “sell-outs” and “puppets of the West” on the other. 
The negative light in the portrayal of opposition serves to prepare ground for various 
kinds of punitive political bashing, ranging from the use of state machinery of violence, 
imprisonment, through to general exclusion of opposition supporters in the benefits 
of public programmes (Uwizeyimana & Cloete 2014:71-72). Former Indigenisation 
Minister, Saviour Kasukuwere, was therefore not hesitant to declare that “our people, 
our ZANU-PF supporters, will benefit and become empowered through this 
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programme” (The Africa Report 2011). Such utterances, however, have been made 
despite the fact that the Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment 
(2016), in responding to frequently asked questions (FAQs), emphasised that “the 
indigenisation and empowerment programme is apolitical and is driven by the 
aspirations of indigenous Zimbabweans rather than political affiliation”. 
 
Class level: “elites as vanguard of the revolution” 
 
It has been felt that the definition of “indigenous Zimbabweans”, as given in the 
legislation, omits key institutions such as the state, local authorities, and state 
corporations, yet economic ownership should ideally be vested in public and collective 
entities to maximise the broadening of benefits at grassroots levels (Gwisai 2011:42). 
The omission, however, is not taken as an innocent oversight, but rather a deliberate 
machination of the framers of legislation who are not necessarily supportive of a 
broad-based programme but instead are pro-elitist and biased towards a class-based 
black national bourgeoisie programme (Gwisai 2011:42). This argument may have 
resonance in the fact that the key vehicles that should ordinarily have given the 
programme its broad-based slant – the community share ownership trusts – were 
initially omitted in the regulatory provisions, when actually these carried the promise 
of benefits to grassroots populations in the rural areas within which mining companies 
are exploiting natural resources. This is despite the fact that rural areas – in terms of 
the mobilisation of votes in electoral seasons – have always constituted an electoral 
stronghold for ZANU-PF. 
 
The early years of the postcolonial period saw indigenisation manifesting an elitist, 
selective, and exclusivist trend, although of course it should be appreciated that in the 
early 1980s the term “indigenisation” had not yet gained any special place in the 
political lexicon of the time. However, at the practical level, indigenisation was already 
taking shape as the political elite (nationalists) invoked their liberation war credentials 
as rationale for deserving significant state rewards by being accorded “privileged 
access to government employment and black empowerment” (Compagnon 2011:194). 
This argument does not only explain the unfair advantage political elites accorded 
themselves in the indigenisation process, but also further explains the 
“embourgeoisiement of the black nationalist class” through extensive capital 
accumulation, looting, and patronage networks that were largely enabled by their full 
control of state structures and apparatus. Compagnon (2011:193) explains that many 
educated blacks in the 1960s had their upward mobility frustrated by the 
segregationist policies of the Rhodesian government, and therefore had more than an 
urge to participate in nationalist politics as their gateway to a better social life and 
economic fortune. 
 
From the early 1980s into the 1990s, with no comprehensive standalone legislation on 
indigenisation in place yet, there was much agitation by indigenous lobby groups 
pressurising the government to enact a law to enable the implementation of the 
indigenisation agenda as an official state policy. Experiences of the time reveal that 
access to indigenisation and affirmative action benefits was asymmetrical, highly 
selective, and largely skewed in favour of a clientilistic, crony business class that had 
very strong links to the state.  
12 
 
As argued by Taylor (1999:258 cited in Selby 2006:253), 
 
“Zimbabwe’s most ‘successful’ black business people are thus notable for their 
close ties to the state [...] and whose rise from ashes to riches is most 
suspicious [....] Since they are already co-opted into the state network they 
pose no political threat to the government [....] [I]n fact they will likely be the 
heirs of the ZANU-PF political machine”. 
  
Influential indigenous business people and frontliners in indigenisation lobby groups, 
such as the Indigenous Business Development Corporation (IBDC), AAG, Indigenous 
Business Women’s Organisation (IBWO), Indigenous Commercial Farmers’ Union 
(ICFU), among others, largely benefited from the state’s indigenisation and affirmative 
action initiatives. Notable names of beneficiaries include Phillip Chiyangwa, Peter 
Pamire, Enock Kamushinda, Roger Boka, and Jane Mutasa, among others. It is 
instructive to note that indigenisation benefits were given only to black business 
people who were willing to be part of the ruling party’s ever-extending patronage 
network that solely depended on state support for its survival. For instance, Strive 
Masiyiwa, an independent black businessman outside the patronage network but 
former secretary-general of the IBDC, had to battle for five years to obtain a 
telecommunications licence, while another businessman, and President Mugabe’s 
nephew, Leo Mugabe, got the same licence within a few months. In addition, Leo 
Mugabe also received several controversial tenders in the mid-1990s. The assimilation 
of rising black businessmen into ruling party structures was clarified in no uncertain 
terms by one of the biggest beneficiaries, Phillip Chiyangwa: “I am rich because I 
belong to ZANU-PF. If you want to be rich like me you must join the ruling party” (The 
Daily News 05/06/2000). 
 
In the post-2007 period, Matondi (2012:15) further observed the accumulation 
tendencies of elites – the political class and leaders of indigenous lobby groups – who 
in recent years have championed dialogue on the indigenisation of the economy. In 
the implementation of the IEE policy framework, elites have been buying shares in big 
businesses where only a well-off class can afford them, while appeasing the poor 
majority and lower classes in specific localities – mostly communities with mineral 
endowments being exploited by mining companies – only with benefits from 
community share ownership schemes. The indigenisation law stipulates that all 
companies exploiting “natural resources” (e.g. minerals) in a particular local area must 
reserve 10% shareholding for Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs), which are 
vehicles that have been created to provide, maintain, and repair local infrastructure 
such as schools, hospitals, roads, dip tanks, and water works, among others. 
Communities in this case only benefit as a collective through the enjoyment of public 
goods sponsored from a common pool of funds injected by companies into the CSOTs. 
The indigenisation legislation, in this light, has been conveniently used to create a 
conducive climate both for advancing elite interests and for sanitising their capital 
accumulation tendencies. They have simply opened an exclusive highway for personal 
enrichment through the legal 51% share ownership in foreign-owned business, most 
of which are multi-billion and multi-million US$ international enterprises. Naturally, 
share ownership in such enterprises is available to the already well-off black tycoons 
who, mostly, are now established in business thanks to their state connections. 
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Matondi (2012:15) accurately concluded that in the indigenisation programme, “the 
elites are caught between a rock and a hard place, because they seek personal 
accumulation of wealth, while worrying about the views of the poor, whose scope for 
accessing such wealth may be just a mirage”.   
 
TERRITORIAL AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE AUTOCHTHONY DISCOURSE 
  
The discourse on autochthony, belonging, citizenship, ethnicity, and identity has 
caught the attention of many scholars (Carleton 2014:66-68; Freeman 2014:349-352; 
Mitchell 2014:401-403; Keller 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2010, 2009; Geschiere 2011, 
2005; Andreasson 2010; Pelican 2009; Dunn 2009; Morten 2009), and among these, 
autochthony – which basically describes original inhabitants of a land, or the “sons of 
the soil” – has generated much heat not only as a rallying force undergirding political 
conflicts and violence in Africa, but also as a global phenomenon in the era of 
globalisation (Dunn 2009:113; Mitchell 2014:401). Carleton (2014:66) analysed the 
autochthony discourse in the context of ownership and control of natural/mineral 
resources by the autochthons who are viewed as the “claimants of mineral resource 
wealth”. In this line of argument, the autochthony discourse, instead of being 
deployed as an instrument to perpetuate violence between indigenous and non-
indigenous Africans, should best be applied on laying claims against foreign settlers – 
the allochthons (Carleton 2014:67). This position takes us to the clash of rights; that 
is, the collision between the territorial rights of autochthons and the property rights of 
allochthons (Carleton 2014:68; Mitchell 2014:401), which unfold in the sense that 
while autochthons enjoy legitimate rights of ownership to land and natural/mineral 
resources, allochthons command significant amounts of resources as owners of capital 
whose motive is the pursuit of profits through the exploitation of mineral resources in 
the developing world.  
 
Instances of autochthony are seen in conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, and Rwanda. The kind of autochthony in these cases has been 
exclusionary in the sense that lines were drawn between those claiming to be “sons 
of the soil” (indigenous Africans or citizens) – and therefore bearers of rights – and 
those deemed to be non-indigenous Africans who were “invaders” (allochthons) 
suspected of going after power and land (Dunn 2009:114). This depiction gave 
occasion for conflict and the killing of the latter; but more importantly, Dunn (2009) 
has argued that the exclusionary autochthony discourse is deployed as a tool for 
safeguarding the position of the sons of the soil who suffer uncertainty and insecurity 
in the face of “invading” non-indigenous Africans. Exclusionary autochthony, with its 
bend towards the creation of political identities, served as a strategic political cleavage 
and proximate counterforce to guarantee autochthons’ security in the context of 
threats generated by the presence of non-indigenous Africans. Dunn’s (2009:114) 
viewpoint suggests that the rise of autochthony discourses in Africa is a response to 
the ontological uncertainty of the postmodern and postcolonial condition. Broader 
African experiences of exclusionary autochthony have parallels in Zimbabwe, 
especially regarding the “indigenisation of land”. Land rights and ownership have 
raised significant problems and controversies. Muzondidya (2004:215) noted that 
despite the fact that the colonial government pushed all “natives” (black Africans) into 
communal areas known as Tribal Trust Lands or native reserves, those of Malawian, 
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Zambian, or Mozambican origin, who initially came as labourers on farms and in mines, 
were not entitled to land rights in the Tribal Trust Lands. This was also the fate of 
coloureds and Asians who could neither be accommodated in European designated 
areas nor in native reserves for the African population. Those who obtained land only 
did so through corrupt, unorthodox means. 
 
In Zimbabwe’s redistribution agenda, the clash of territorial and property rights is no 
better exemplified anywhere than in the country’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
(FTLRP) of 2000. Around 1995 and 1996, state-linked businessman Roger Boka and 
businessman and AAG leader Phillip Chiyangwa and their followers embarked on some 
thinly veiled, racially loud lobbying, urging Mugabe and his government to 
compulsorily expropriate white-owned land without compensation (Compagnon 
2011:202). Their racialised advocacy for coercive resource expropriation 
foreshadowed the radically transformed new millennium land ownership patterns since 
the lobby group successfully secured Mugabe’s assent to their calls. This was sealed 
by the enactment of Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 16) Act in 2000, 
which enabled the state to compulsorily confiscate land without compensation to the 
white commercial farmers. Thereafter several farms were gazetted for acquisition: 
2 030 in June 2001 and 4 874 in January 2002 (Thomas 2003:701). Eventually, at 
least 4 800 white farmers had their farms, covering approximately 11 million hectares, 
confiscated by the government (The Financial Gazette 16/03/2016). Mugabe, 
however, repeatedly claimed publicly that his government had no option but to 
compulsorily acquire white-owned land following a breakdown in the Zimbabwe-Britain 
bilateral relations specifically on the land issue. Mugabe accused the British 
government of reneging on its promise to provide funds to purchase land from white 
commercial farmers (Chilunjika & Uwizeyimana 2015:134). In terms of the Lancaster 
House Agreement of 1979, Great Britain had the obligation to provide funds needed 
in the land redistribution programme, but by 1996, she had only contributed barely 
half the amount required, and what is worse, payments stopped coming by that time 
(The Daily Mirror 18/04/2006). Specifically, Britain promised to pay £45 million, but 
ended up paying only £17 million (Hanlon, Manjengwa & Smart 2013:73). Mugabe 
explained his side of the story thus: 
 
“The British – since Tony Blair came to power and changed the face of the 
Labour Party completely in disregard to relations with us – have reneged on 
the understanding and agreement reached at Lancaster House regarding the 
land reform programme and the compensation they agreed to pay to enable 
us to buy the land from their kith and kin here” (Mugabe cited in Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2009:1140). 
 
Concurring with this position, Thomas (2003:692) actually suggested that it would still 
be in order if the British government would compensate the dispossessed commercial 
white farmers since, initially, the responsibility to do so was solely theirs. The ZANU-
PF regime then partly used Britain’s failure to honour its promise as rationale for 
seizing white-owned commercial farms without compensation. They coupled this with 
revisiting the history of colonialism to justify and prepare ground for latter-day 
reclamation of territory of which they were violently dispossessed by white settlers 
more than a century ago. In light of these developments, the government’s tone was 
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changing fast, and accusations continued to grow against Britain; for example, one 
media opinion highlighted that “the US$45 million contributed by Great Britain paled 
in contrast to the billions it expropriated from the people and land through the colonial 
period. By emphasising that land be held in so-called ‘capable’ hands, British officials 
encouraged the continued dominance of the agricultural sector by white commercial 
farmers” (The Daily Mirror 18/04/2006). Britain’s rather uncooperative attitude 
effortlessly convinced sections of landless blacks that the indigenisation of land was 
going to take longer than expected despite having already waited for two decades – 
a period that saw a very slow delivery of land under the willing seller-willing buyer 
paradigm that was adopted in the early 1980s (Chilunjika & Uwizeyimana 2015:135). 
Frustration with slow delivery of land coupled with Britain’s parsimonious attitude, or 
even hostility, to the land issue bred the rise of autochthonic violence which resonated 
with what Moyo and Yeros (2007:1) described as the emergence of “the radicalised 
state”, exemplified first and foremost by the FTLRP of 2000 (Mandizadza 2010:132). 
The frustration and pent-up anger of the landless peasants and war veterans led to 
violent confrontations, land invasions, occupation, and seizure of white-owned farms 
(Hanlon et al. 2013:72). Several works highlight the high incidence of violence; murder 
of white land owners and their farm workers, human rights violations, and disrespect 
for property rights through acts of arson that have largely been condoned by the state 
(Matondi 2012; Freeth 2011). 
 
Against the background of the Zimbabwe-Britain dispute, land ownership became 
much racialised, and sons of the soil narratives were foregrounded to reinforce the 
now preferred ideology of Black Nationalism that became convenient in driving the 
government’s redistribution agenda in the context of a perceived global hostile political 
climate. Sidelining the conciliatory approach ushered in by the reconciliation policy of 
the early 1980s, the issue of land ownership was portrayed as pitting “erstwhile 
colonisers” who stole African land against a dispossessed black African population 
making every attempt to regain what settlers “stole” from them. Indeed, the 
government had taken a hardline stance which went together with a defensive mode 
adopted conveniently to repel claims of compensation by white land owners. 
Autochthonal violence continued to receive the “undeclared” blessing of the state 
through frequent racist pronouncements by the country’s leadership; for instance, 
President Mugabe continually declared: “We say no to whites owning our land and 
they should go. They can own companies and apartments in our towns and cities, but 
not the soil. It is ours and that message should ring loud and clear in Britain and the 
United States” (The Financial Gazette 31/03/2016). The push for dispossessing white 
land owners has persisted to date, with a fresh call to expropriate land owned by the 
remaining 400 white farmers declared by President Mugabe at one of his 2017 
countrywide Presidential Youth Interface Rallies: “We are going to take those farms 
and redistribute them to our youths, some of whom did not benefit from the land 
reform programme” (The Daily News 04/07/2017).  
 
Compensation issues are property rights issues, and therefore, denied compensation 
for expropriated land means denial of property rights to the land owners (Richardson 
2005:541). The government’s position regarding compensation issues is currently 
unclear, discordant, and even deceptive. In a meeting held in Harare with staff of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2016, the government deceptively put up a 
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smokescreen of reform efforts under way, including a plan of compensating white 
commercial farmers (Mwakalyelye 2016:1). The Minister of Finance, Honourable 
Patrick Chinamasa, unveiled a memorandum on the establishment of a Land 
Compensation Fund – ostensibly meant to facilitate compensation of white farmers – 
which was tabled before Parliament (The Financial Gazette 16/03/2016; Mwakalyelye 
2016:1). However, Chinamasa did not have critical buy-in from Cabinet, and some of 
the ministers, including the Lands Minister, even professed ignorance of the 
memorandum. The façade of reform was put up to secure IMF approval of government 
efforts targeting economic recovery and mending of international relations. The 
government was playing into the IMF’s fancy, seemingly in compliance with the latter’s 
policy recommendation, which suggested that compensation of dispossessed 
commercial white farmers was part of the key prerequisites for Zimbabwe’s recovery 
and reintegration into the international community (The Financial Gazette 
16/03/2016). The amount to compensate the former commercial farmers has been 
estimated to be between US$7 billion and US$11 billion – an amount that is obviously 
beyond the capacity of the government in the currently stressed economic space.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article attempted to articulate the indigenisation discourse – which is more or less 
the flagship programme of the government’s broad redistribution agenda that arose 
in the early years of independence. As a matter of a shared claim among several 
African countries, the history of colonialism and continued dominance of foreign capital 
has always been cited as the most proximate justification for the pursuit of 
indigenisation policies and the related affirmative action programmes that 
predominantly targeted the previously marginalised black African population as 
beneficiaries. While the justification for the need of indigenisation demonstrably invites 
little or no dispute, the practical application and/or implementation of the 
indigenisation programme has largely been significantly political and divisive. 
“Indigeneity” in the Zimbabwean context has been rendered an uneasy and porous 
concept that has consequently generated wide debates among several scholars whose 
arguments seem to suggest that claims over ownership of territory are both 
problematic and not easily defensible. In the wake of the political polarisation that 
came with the growing wave of opposition politics in the post-2000 period, 
indigenisation benefits became heavily politicised. Facing threats on its political 
ground, the ruling ZANU-PF conveniently deployed the indigenisation agenda – with 
even more intensity – firstly, using the FTLRP, which was basically understood as 
“indigenisation of land”; and secondly, following the enactment of the IEE Act of 2007, 
with the thrust on “indigenisation of the economy”. In both cases, the rhetoric was 
widely sold to the population in a bid to salvage waning legitimacy. Closer analysis, 
however, suggests that the programmes were not open to all as beneficiaries were 
mostly political followers of the proponents of the programmes. Interestingly, even 
within the bracket of the supposed beneficiaries, benefits were not evenly spread, as 
class issues and strength of personal connections to state leadership were other key 
determinants of the magnitude of personal benefit. This gave rise to the visibility of 
cronyism and clientelism involving both the aspiring and established indigenous 
business class exploiting linkages with the political elite. Within the whole 
redistribution agenda, the paper also observes the existence of exclusionary, artificial, 
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and deliberate bifurcations mainly along racial, political, class, and nationality lines in 
the practical application of the indigenisation agenda. Against this background, issues 
of belonging, citizenship, nativism, and autochthony have been directly pushed to the 
fore, especially following the land dispossession of white commercial farmers in the 
FTLRP. 
 
NOTE 
This article is partly based on an uncompleted doctoral thesis: Initials and surname. 
Year: Title under the supervision of Dr D Uwizeyimana and co-supervision of Prof C J 
Auriacombe. 
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